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Commentaries
AN ECONOMIST’S PERSPECTIVE ON
WELL-BEING ANALYSIS AND COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS
CAROL GRAHAM†
As a starting point, it is important to note that I come to this
from the blunt-tooled perspective of an economist, rather than from
the more refined conceptual approach of lawyers. Lawyers take much
more time to unbundle underlying conceptual definitions into
statements that can pass legal argument. Economists worry much
more about translating questions of inquiry into equations which,
when run on empirical data, can produce statistically and
methodologically rigorous results. Although these two approaches are
markedly different, I think there is mutual benefit to be gained from
the professions talking more to each other. I surely benefited from
reading these excellent articles.
That said, before we can think about sound legal arguments for
utilizing these metrics (and the related concepts that they invoke), we
should recognize that there is still a lot that we do not know in terms
of what we are actually measuring when we discuss well-being.
Although we have a clear sense of the various dimensions of wellbeing and which metrics measure each dimension, there is still an
important dimension of well-being that falls into the economist’s
category of unobservables. Well-being is driven by variables between
aspects that are observable, such as socioeconomic and demographic
traits, and those that are unobservable, such as innate character traits,
genes, and other such things that are difficult to measure. Yet those
interactions are fundamental to well-being and to the related
behavioral outcomes that we are trying to understand. There is some
exciting new work that tries to disentangle the genetic components of
1
well-being from what is determined by the environment, for example,
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1. See, e.g., Jan-Emmanuel De Neve & Andrew J. Oswald, Estimating the Influence of
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as well as experimental work that compares predicted well-being to
2
actual choice behavior. Yet even in that work, there are still
questions about what the “it” that we are actually trying to measure
is. Income, in contrast, is much simpler to define, if also less
interesting.
I raise that point as a note of caution in terms of our ability to be
as precise as these articles suggest that we should be about the
underlying concepts of well-being. The economist’s blunt-tooled
approach seeks regularities in large scale data sets and then teases out
the precise relationship underlying them, while perhaps falling short
on some of the conceptual clarity that lawyers are asking for. This
approach has some merit in helping us understand what is still in the
realm of the unknown. Well-being is an exciting area precisely
because it seeks to define human welfare more broadly than in simple
income terms, yet that also raises a gray area where it is less clear
exactly what it is we are defining.
That caveat aside, there is a consensus among economists and
psychologists studying well-being on its two distinct dimensions—
hedonic and evaluative. Indeed, answering the question of how each
of these dimensions is relevant to policy and to our national statistics
is the task for the new National Academy of Sciences panel (of which
I am a member).
Coming from that perspective, I have some genuine criticism of
both articles. I disagree with Professor Matthew Adler’s conclusion
3
that only experienced well-being is appropriate for policy, and I am
concerned that the article by Professors John Bronsteen, Christopher
Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur does not unbundle well-being into
4
its distinct dimensions. There is good information and analysis in
both articles, and I will highlight that in my comments, but I would
like to provide a bit more detail on the two dimensions of wellbeing—and how they relate to policy—first.
The first dimension, hedonic well-being (HWB), which I have

Life Satisfaction and Positive Affect on Later Income Using Sibling Fixed Effects, 109 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 19,953 (2012).
2. See, e.g., Daniel J. Benjamin, Ori Heffetz, Miles S. Kimball & Alex Rees-Jones, What
Do You Think Would Make You Happier? What Do You Think You Would Choose?, 102 AM.
ECON. REV. 2083 (2012).
3. Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: What’s the Use?, 62 DUKE
L.J. 1509, 1520 (2013).
4. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs.
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013).
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categorized in past work as “Benthamite,” is related to the
environment or context in which people live—the quality of their
jobs, their immediate state of health, the nature of their commute to
work, and the nature of their social networks—and is reflected in
5
positive and negative affective states, among other things. Daily
experience is linked to health status and other outcomes via channels
such as worry and stress on the one hand, and pleasure and
6
enjoyment on the other.
How people think about and evaluate their lives as a whole, as
measured by evaluative well-being (EWB) metrics, reflects a more
global, life-course view and is likely also to be related to longer-term
7
behaviors, such as investments in health and education. This
dimension of well-being, which in previous work I have roughly
categorized as “Aristotelian,” implicitly encompasses a eudemonic
component such as the extent of purpose and meaning that people
8
derive from their jobs, their relationships, and their lives. It is, in my
view, inherently related to the opportunities that people have to
exercise choice and to pursue fulfilling lives.
The dimension of well-being that survey respondents emphasize
or value most may be mediated by their agency and capacity to
control their lives. Professors Daniel Kahneman and Angus Deaton,
for example, find that income correlates much more closely with
9
EWB than with HWB in the United States. The correlation between
HWB and income tapers off at roughly $75,000 or roughly median
income for the U.S., but the correlation between income and EWB
10
continues in a linear fashion. After a certain point, more income
cannot make people enjoy their daily lives more (although

5. CAROL GRAHAM, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AN ECONOMY OF WELL-BEING 33,
36 (2011). As I note there, my characterization of HWB as “Benthamite” is perhaps itself
characteristic of “a rogue economist delving into the philosopher’s world.” Id. at 33.
6. Id. at 42–44.
7. See id. at 56 (“[S]hort-term frustration or delayed gratification often is necessary to
complete certain goals . . . , and the negative experience component [of well-being] is likely
outweighed by the overall contribution that achieving such goals makes to well-being in a life
evaluation sense.”).
8. Id. at 33.
9. See Daniel Kahneman & Angus Deaton, High Income Improves Evaluation of Life but
Not Emotional Well-Being, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16,489, 16,492 (2010) (“[I]ncome is
more strongly related to satisfaction than to happiness . . . .”).
10. See id. at 16,491 (“[B]eyond about $75,000/y, there is no improvement whatever in any
of the three measures of emotional well-being. In contrast, . . . [there is] a fairly steady rise in
life evaluation with log income over the entire range [of incomes].”).
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insufficient income is clearly linked to suffering and negative moods),
but higher levels of income offer people many more choices about
11
how to live and what to do with their lives.
Similarly, Eduardo Lora and I find that the most important
variables to the reported life satisfaction of the “poor” in Latin
America (which we define as survey respondents living in households
with below-median household income), after having enough food to
12
eat, are having friends and family to rely on in times of need. In
contrast, the most important variables to the life satisfaction of the
“rich” (which we define as respondents above the median income)
13
are work and health. It is likely that friends and family are the vital
safety nets that make daily life tolerable for the poor, whereas work
and health provide wealthier respondents with the agency to make
14
choices in their lives.
Individuals who focus primarily on daily experiences—due to low
expectations, lack of agency, or imposed social norms—may have less
15
incentive to invest in the future. In rapidly growing developing
economies, I find lower levels of reported EWB among respondents
with high levels of income mobility than among very poor rural
16
respondents with no mobility or future prospects of such. In the
United States, I find that the obese have lower levels of EWB than
the nonobese, but that the negative well-being effects are mitigated if
they are in high-obesity cohorts. High-obesity cohorts also have lower
17
levels of income mobility, meanwhile. It seems that people are better
able to adapt to unpleasant certainty and retain relatively high levels
of well-being (and likely higher in the HWB dimension than in the
EWB dimension) than to live with uncertainty, even that which is

11. See id. at 16,492 (“More money does not necessarily buy more happiness, but less
money is associated with emotional pain. Perhaps $75,000 is a threshold beyond which further
increases in income no longer improve individuals’ ability to do what matters most to their
emotional well-being, such as spending time with people they like, avoiding pain and disease,
and enjoying leisure.”).
12. GRAHAM, supra note 5, at 37–38, 48.
13. Id. at 48.
14. See id. at 49 (“The findings on the importance of work and health to the well-being of
the rich and the importance of friendships to the well-being of the poor in Latin America are
illustrative . . . [of the fact that] people may . . . emphasize different dimensions of happiness
more because of what they are capable of—for example, agency—and in part because of
inherent character traits.”).
15. Id. at 43.
16. Id. at 57–61.
17. Id. at 43–44.

GRAHAM IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

AN ECONOMIST’S PERSPECTIVE

4/15/2013 2:58 PM

1695

18

associated with progress.
Individuals who have a longer-term focus and are more
achievement oriented, meanwhile, may at times sacrifice daily
experiences for longer-term objectives and anticipated EWB in the
19
future. Extreme manifestations of this sacrifice include those who
choose to migrate to another country to provide their children with
opportunities, and those who choose to participate in social unrest for
20
a broader societal objective. My initial research with Julie
Markowitz based on intent-to-migrate data from Latin America
shows that these more extreme behavioral choices are associated with
21
lower ex-ante levels of well-being (EWB and HWB).
Indeed, an important and less well-understood aspect of wellbeing is its causal properties. Some research suggests that higher
levels of well-being are, on average, linked to positive behavioral
outcomes, such as healthier living and better performance in the labor
22
market. But this work is in its initial stages. Equally important, the
two distinct dimensions of well-being may have distinct unobservable
dimensions and very different causal properties. As such, the
different measures will drive different policy choices and design.
Policies designed to enhance HWB, such as quality of living at the
18. See Carol Graham, Adaptation Amidst Prosperity and Adversity: Insights from
Happiness Studies from Around the World, 26 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 105, 132 (2011)
(“Understanding that, on average, adapting to unpleasant certainty is easier than adapting to
less unpleasant uncertainty can help explain opposition to policy reforms in contexts which
seem intolerable and in dire need of change by most external assessments.”); Carol Graham,
Lucas Higuera & Eduardo Lora, Which Health Conditions Cause the Most Unhappiness?, 20
HEALTH ECON. 1431, 1443–44 (2011) (“Our findings highlight the importance of conditions
associated with uncertainty over those of mobility and self-care. . . . Individuals seem better able
to adapt to one-time health shocks—such as a loss in mobility—than they are to conditions
which are associated with uncertainty, such as anxiety and pain.”). See generally Carol Graham,
Happiness and Health: Lessons—and Questions—for Public Policy, 27 HEALTH AFF. 72, 83–85
(2008).
19. See GRAHAM, supra note 5, at 44–45 (“Highly driven ‘type A’ personalities may enjoy
the events of each day less but get more satisfaction out of their overall life . . . .”).
20. Id. at 23–24.
21. See Carol Graham & Julie Markowitz, Aspirations and Happiness of Potential Latin
American Immigrants, J. SOC. RES. & POL’Y, Dec. 2011, at 9, 14 (“[T]hose with intent to
migrate assess their present economic situation . . . lower relative to those who do not express
interest in migrating. . . . [P]otential immigrants also report lower happiness levels generally
compared to non-immigrants.”).
22. See supra note 1, at 19,954; Ed Diener & Micaela Y. Chan, Happy People Live Longer:
Subjective Well-Being Contributes to Health and Longevity, 3 APPLIED PSYCHOL.: HEALTH &
WELL-BEING 1, 32–33 (2011); Carol Graham, Andrew Eggers & Sandip Sukhtankar, Does
Happiness Pay? An Exploration Based on Panel Data from Russia, 55 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
319, 337–40 (2004).
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end of life, are very different from those aimed at enhancing EWB,
such as the education and opportunities of youth, for example.
If daily experiences are negative enough, meanwhile, they might
overturn objectives of policies that are designed to enhance longerterm opportunities and well-being. George Akerlof cites research on
kids in gangs in New York City who receive scholarships to go to top
23
boarding schools. Yet these students do not fit in at the new schools
when they go, and they find the experience so unpleasant that they
24
drop out. When these students return home, however, they no
25
longer fit into their home environments. The negative daily
26
experiences eventually determined the long-run outcomes. My own
research on happy peasants versus upwardly mobile, frustrated
achievers—whose lives are rather unpleasant on a daily basis but are
progressing out of poverty into lives with a fuller opportunity set—is
relevant here because it highlights the extent to which the process of
27
making progress or change can be a very unpleasant experience.
Having both sets of metrics is important because a lack of
understanding of the HWB effects of certain policies could result in
failure before they achieve longer-term objectives.
Both of the articles provide a discussion, from a legal
perspective, of how or if well-being metrics can contribute to policy
questions and decisions. The Adler article is more skeptical and
provides a number of compelling reasons for the need to be cautious
about EWB in the policy arena, while for the most part endorsing the
28
usage of HWB metrics. The Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur
article is more of an endorsement of well-being metrics in general,
and it assesses them more favorably than cost-benefit analysis (CBA)
29
in a number of areas. Although I accept many of the good points in
both articles, I neither agree with Adler that the flaws of EWB
metrics are sufficient to dismiss them from the policy arena, nor do I

23. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: HOW OUR
IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING (2010).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See GRAHAM, supra note 5, at 22–23. (“[R]espondents in countries with higher growth
rates were, on average, less happy than those in countries with lower growth rates . . . . One
explanation . . . is found in the increases in instability and inequality that often accompany
economic growth booms.”).
28. Adler, supra note 3, at 1599–1600.
29. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 4, at 1615.
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believe that a blanket endorsement of well-being metrics, without
distinguishing between the two dimensions, as in the case of
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, is sufficient.
Professor Adler’s excellent article Happiness Surveys and Public
Policy: What’s the Use? does a good job of critiquing economists for
their lack of rigor in handling normative concepts, such as well-being,
preference satisfaction, and utility, and, as such, having insufficient
30
engagement with philosophy. I accept that criticism and learned
from the article. Professor Adler does a good job of distinguishing
between preference-based and experience-based accounts of well31
being, definitions that roughly correlate with the evaluative and
hedonic concepts that I raise above. Preference-based well-being goes
beyond daily experiences and includes preferences for items such as
goals, knowledge, and purpose, which extend beyond individuals’
32
daily experiences. This is exactly what we attempt to measure with
evaluative metrics.
Indeed, it is this eudemonic component of well-being that we
know the least about (and is the subject of my newest research). It is
also possible, as I suggested above, that increasing this dimension of
well-being may require lowering HWB, at least in the short term (as
in the case of studying for the bar, for example). Professor Adler
criticizes the scholars in the field for not having spent enough time
investigating the relative importance that individuals attach to each of
33
these dimensions. I would argue that disentangling which dimension
of well-being survey respondents most emphasize is precisely where

30. Adler, supra note 3, at 1560–63 (discussing econometric methodology and arguing that,
among other things, “the flaw in this strategy—well-recognized by many economists in the SWB
literature—is that there may be unobserved individual-specific factors that both cause variation
in stated SWB and cause (or otherwise are correlated with) the attributes [of an individual at a
particular time]”).
31. See id. at 1521 (“A key distinction is that between experientialist and nonexperientialist
conceptions of well-being. A preference-based conception of well-being falls in the
nonexperientialist category because an individual can hold an intrinsic preference for items
other than her own experiences.”).
32. See id. at 1519 (“[O]n a standard preference-based account of well-being, the
fundamental arguments for an individual’s preferences—what she intrinsically prefers and
disprefers—might well include items external to her mind, such as her physical health, her
accumulation of material goods, her freedom and autonomy, her accomplishments, and so
forth.”).
33. See id. at 1536 (“The SWB literature regularly blurs the line between preferencerealization (on the one hand) and feelings of satisfaction or beliefs regarding preferencerealization (on the other), and to the related point that individuals can have intrinsic
preferences for items other than their own mental states.”).
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the most new and exciting research is focused today, including by
Professor Paul Dolan, an economist who Professor Adler cites and
34
with whom he has co-authored. I agree with Professor Adler that we
need to know more about this question, and it is precisely this area
that I cite above as the gray, unobservable area that we know the
least about conceptually. At least initially, we may have to tease out
answers from empirical work, including experiments.
This is a fundamental critique and one that my profession needs
to respond to in much greater detail. I applaud Professor Adler for
his eloquent discussion along these lines. I disagree with him, though,
that hedonic well-being measures are the only ones that we can use
35
for policy. Because they are limited to daily experience, they miss
precisely the gray and unknown area that is what, in the end, wellbeing metrics can help us better understand about human welfare.
This includes questions such as what drives people’s quest for
purpose, opportunity, and achievement, and why these things vary
across individuals. Professor Adler’s Mr. Cheery versus Mr. Grumpy
36
example in the article speaks to this very point.
Professor Adler makes a number of other points, for example,
about scale heterogeneity, mood effects, and ordinality versus
37
cardinality. It would be beyond the scope of this commentary to go
into each of these in detail. Yet I would like to make the case here
that we know enough about these problems to be able to correct for
them methodologically. We can, for example, test different scales and
adjust for bias, test for mood effects, and run ordinary least squares
and ordered probit or logit regressions side by side and show that the
results, one imposing cardinality and the other not, yield identical
results.
There is one way, meanwhile, that Professor Adler’s and my

34. See, e.g., Matthew Adler & Paul Dolan, Introducing a “Different Lives” Approach to
the Valuation of Health and Well-Being 11 (Kenan Inst. for Ethics at Duke Univ., Working
Paper No. 5, 2012).
35. See Adler, supra note 3, at 1520 (“The weak EQ defense is by far the most plausible
basis for incorporating SWB data into policy analysis.”).
36. See id. at 1592–93 (“Cheery is upbeat, but forgets much of what happens to him, and his
stock of propositional knowledge is pretty mediocre. Grumpy goes through daily life in an
affective state that is at or slightly below neutral, but he is keenly focused on the sights and
sounds around him, can recollect his past in rich detail, and has educated himself in various
fields. Assume, further, that Cheery and Grumpy are more or less the same in their objective
characteristics (income, health, job status, social life). Is it clear that Cheery lives a better life
than Grumpy? Hardly.”).
37. Id. at 1549–60.
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views might be more closely aligned. His argument suggests that wellbeing metrics would be the sole basis for making policy decisions and,
as such, holds them up to a bar of conceptual clarity and precision in
measurement that we may never achieve (nor, I would argue, that
38
income metrics have been able to achieve). Using this bar, the
hedonic metrics are much more precise because what they seek to
measure is conceptually simpler. Yet most scholars who are studying
well-being metrics in the policy arena focus on how well-being metrics
can inform policy decisions at the margin, as complements to, rather
39
than substitutes for, existing metrics of welfare. In this instance,
some of his concerns about the unanswered conceptual issues in
EWB, although still relevant, would be less consequential.
The second article, authored by Professors Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur and entitled Well-Being Analysis vs. CostBenefit Analysis, compares CBA based on contingent valuations to
40
analysis of the same questions based on well-being metrics. The
authors make a good case that well-being metrics are able to
overcome many problems, such as the ability to survey actual
reported well-being in real time, rather than using data based on
41
hypothetical future choices. I very much agree with that.
I also agree with the authors that it is much more difficult to
42
manipulate well-being data than the critics assume. With a properly
designed and implemented well-being survey, respondents do not
know that their well-being response is being matched with any
43
environmental or policy condition or question. Instead, their
reported well-being is the first question in the survey, and it is
matched to those of similar respondents based on all of the usual
socioeconomic and demographic controls. We can then assess the
differentials in well-being across these respondents, who are driven by
different health, environmental, or policy conditions, such as whether
38. See id. at 1518 (“A more precise and nuanced engagement with different possible
conceptions of well-being is needed.”).
39. GRAHAM, supra note 5, 106–07, 111.
40. See generally Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 4.
41. Id. at 1655 (“[R]evealed-preference studies suffer from an additional incurable flaw,
one that WBA does not share. The flaw is that they rely upon affective forecasting: the
prediction of how an individual will feel about an event or a condition before it happens.”).
42. See id. at 1632 (“[T]he types of highly charged political issues that might cause
individuals to manipulate well-being surveys would also cause them to manipulate well-being
surveys would also cause them to manipulate contingent valuation syrveys, possibly to greater
effect.”).
43. Id.
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they smoke, live with contaminated air, or with more or less inflation,
44
for example. As such, their answers cannot be easily manipulated by
45
politicians.
Although I agree with the article’s critique of forecasting and
discounting errors in contingent valuations, I would also highlight the
limitations of well-being metrics in addressing intertemporal issues.
HWB metrics, for example, measure happiness today, whereas EWB
metrics in theory measure happiness over the life course. But there is
a lot of unknown territory as we analyze responses. When people
assess their lives as a whole, are they considering simply their own or
also their children’s well-being, for example? One can imagine quite
different conditions satisfying the former over the latter.
My main critique of the article, though, is that it gives insufficient
attention to the differences between EWB and HWB. For example,
the authors cite Professors Kahneman and Deaton’s 2010 article as
46
finding that money only matters to well-being up to median income.
Kahneman and Deaton’s finding is two-fold, however. They find that
the relationship between income and HWB tapers off at median
levels of income, but, in contrast, the correlation between income and
47
EWB is a linear one up to the highest levels of income. My view is
that the discrepancy is because the income variable captures
opportunities and ability to make the choices that determine higher
levels of EWB. Good moods and daily experiences, meanwhile, are
not enhanced by higher levels of income once essential needs are
48
met. The authors’ comparison of well-being and CBA would greatly
benefit from distinguishing between the two dimensions of well-being
and what they measure.
I learned a great deal from both articles, and each will help us
think through the very difficult challenges of applying these new
concepts and metrics to the measurement of human welfare. And
they will also, I hope, contribute to more collaboration between
lawyers and economists in the future.

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1620.
47. Kahneman & Deaton, supra note 9, at 16,491–92. For full disclosure, I was the main
reviewer for Kahneman and Deaton’s article.
48. See GRAHAM, supra note 5, at 16–17 (“On average, wealthier countries (as a group) are
happier than poor ones (as a group); happiness seems to rise with income up to a certain point,
but not beyond it. . . . [A]fter basic needs are met, factors other than income . . . become
increasingly important.”).

